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Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There have been many efforts to reconcile judicial review with democratic self-government. 
Some such efforts attempt to justify judicial review if and to the extent that it promotes self-rule. 
Active Liberty, by Justice Stephen Breyer, is in this tradition; but it is also marked by a heavy 
pragmatic orientation, emphasizing as it does the need for close attention to purposes and to the 
importance of consequences to legal interpretation. Its distinctiveness lies in its effort to forge 
close connections among three seemingly disparate ideas: a democratic account of judicial 
review; a purposive understanding of legal texts; and a neo-pragmatic emphasis on 
consequences. Breyer’s argument is convincing insofar as it challenges “originalist” approach 
on pragmatic grounds. It is more vulnerable insofar it downplays the inevitable role of judicial 
discretion in the characterization of purposes and the evaluation of consequences. Those who 
emphasize consequences, and active liberty, might well end up embracing textualism, or even 
broad judicial deference to legislative majorities. Moreover, it is not simple to deduce, from the 
general idea of “active liberty,” concrete conclusions on the issues that concern Breyer, such as 
affirmative action, campaign finance reform, privacy rights, and commercial advertising. Many 
competing approaches to these issues, and to interpretation as a whole, can also march proudly 
under the pragmatic banner. 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago Law School. This essay grows out of Cass R. Sunstein, The Philosopher-Justice, The 
New Republic (Sept. 19, 2005); I have substantially revised and expanded the discussion here, and in some 
ways the basic orientation has shifted. I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for extremely valuable comments 
on a previous draft. 2 
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that 
otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?—fated or free?—material or 
spiritual?—here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and 
disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to 
interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference 
would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? 
 
         —William  James
1 
 
 
 
A Concise Statement of the Task 
 
In interpreting a statute a court should: 
 
1.  Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate 
position of it which may be involved . . . . 
 
It should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature 
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. 
 
       — H e n r y   H a r t   a n d   A l b e r t   S a c k s
2 
 
 
 
I.  Preliminaries: Judicial Review and Democracy 
 
Throughout the nation’s history, many of the most prominent constitutional 
theorists have tried to reconcile judicial review with the national commitment to 
democratic self-rule. They have argued that if the Supreme Court acts in a certain way, it 
can coexist comfortably with democracy after all.
3 Much of this work is highly 
conceptual—more theoretical than pragmatic, in the sense that abstract ideas, rather than 
concrete consequences, are in the foreground. 
Early in the twentieth century, for example, James Bradley Thayer emphasized 
democratic considerations in order to argue that the Supreme Court should strike down 
legislation only “when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a 
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational 
                                                 
1 Williams James, What Pragmatism Means, in Pragmatism (1907). 
2 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 1374, 1378 (William Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
eds. 1994). 
3 Some approaches, of course, insist that a constitutional democracy imposes constraints on democratic 
self-rule, not reducible to self-government in any way. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1996).  3 
question.”
4 In Thayer’s view, “whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”
5 Thayer 
believed that courts should take the same approach to challenged legislation that juries 
take to criminal defendants; thus he argued that the Supreme Court should uphold the 
actions of the elected branches unless their invalidity is “very plain and clear, clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
6 Thayer’s view was largely followed by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, perhaps the greatest figure in the history of American law, who generally agreed 
with his plea for judicial deference to the legislature. In Holmes words, “If my fellow 
citizens want to go to Hell I’ll help them. It’s my job.”
7 Unlike Thayer, Holmes was 
inspired by pragmatism,
8 but his own arguments, at least as they appeared in judicial 
opinions, were quite abstract.
9 In the period after Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
Thayer’s approach had a significant role on the Supreme Court,
10 embraced as it 
generally was by Felix Frankfurter,
11 Holmes’ disciple. 
12  
To many people, the idea of judicial deference to the elected branches lost much 
of its theoretical appeal in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Supreme Court, under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was invalidating school segregation,
13 protecting 
freedom of speech,
14 striking down poll taxes,
15 requiring a rule of one person, one 
                                                 
4 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Holmes to Laski, March 4, 1920, Holmes--Laski Letters, vol. 1, p. 249. The major exception to 
Holmes’ posture of restraint was the area of free speech. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
8 See Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (2002). 
9 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45, XX (Holmes, J., dissenting). We can, however, find a 
highly compressed pragmatic claim in Holmes’ suggestion that the Constitution “is made for people of 
fundamentally different views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or 
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.” The key pragmatic phrase here, and 
the best one, is the reference to “the accident of our finding certain opinion natural and familiar or novel 
and even shocking.” The key pragmatic word, and the best one, is “accident.” 
10 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937). 
11 See West Virginia School District v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
12 There is a resemblance between Holmes’ approach and the embrace of Schumpeterian democracy in 
Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 143-154 (2003). Note that Posner rejects what he 
sees as romantic or aspirational accounts of democracy; he sees politics in deromanticized terms, “as a 
competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people, 
assumed also to be self-interested, and to be none too interested in or well informed about politics.” 
Breyer’s more aspirational conception of politics is in a very different spirit; see in particular the emphasis 
on participation (pp. 134-35). 
13 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 US 483 (1954). 
14 See Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 US 444 (1969). 4 
vote,
16 and protecting accused criminals against police abuse.
17 Is it possible to defend 
the Warren Court against the charge that its decisions were fatally undemocratic? The 
most elaborate effort came from John Hart Ely, the Warren Court’s most celebrated 
expositor and defender, who famously argued for what he called a “representation-
reinforcing”  approach to judicial review.
18 Like Thayer, Ely emphasized the central 
importance of democratic self-rule. But Ely famously insisted that if self-rule is really our 
loadstar, then unqualified judicial deference to legislatures is utterly senseless. Some 
rights, Ely argued, are indispensable to self-rule, and the Court legitimately protects those 
rights not in spite of democracy but in its name.
19 The right to vote and the right to speak 
are the central examples. Courts promote democracy when they protect those rights.  
Ely went much further. He argued that some groups are at a systematic 
disadvantage in the democratic process, and that when courts protect “discrete and insular 
minorities,” they are reinforcing democracy too.
20 Ely was particularly concerned with 
African-Americans, whom he saw as unable to protect themselves in politics. But with 
some qualifications, his plea for judicial protection extended to other groups as well.
21 
And while Ely was clearly concerned with consequences, his argument stressed 
democracy’s preconditions, and indeed the general idea of equal concern and respect.
22 
A third theory of constitutional interpretation, stressed most prominently by 
Justice Antonin Scalia
23 and also favored by Clarence Thomas,
24 is “originalism.” 
Invoking both self-government and the rule of law, originalists believe that the 
Constitution should be interpreted to mean what it meant at the time that it was ratified. If 
the Equal Protection Clause was originally understood to permit sex discrimination, then 
courts should permit sex discrimination. If the Second Amendment was originally 
understood to forbid gun control, then courts should forbid gun control. When President 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966). 
16 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964). 
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 
18 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 181 (1983). 
19 Id. at 105-34. 
20 See id. at 135-177. 
21 Id. at 160-70. 
22 Id. at 82. 
23 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989). 
24 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist v. Newdow, 542 US 1, XXYY (2004) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 5 
Bush praises “strict construction,” many people take him to be embracing originalism. 
25 
Originalists like Scalia do not follow Thayer’s approach, because they are quite prepared 
to strike down legislation that violates the original understanding. Originalists do not 
defend Ely’s idea of “representation-reinforcing” judicial review. But in their own way, 
originalists too prize democracy. They emphasize that the Constitution was ratified by 
We the People, who have sovereign authority, and they want to limit the discretion of 
federal judges, who are after all unelected.
26  
It is true that those who ratified the Constitution are long dead, and this point 
might be thought to create a real problem for originalists who attempt to defend their 
approach on democratic grounds. Why—in the name of self-government?—should 
current citizens be bound by those who lived long ago? But democracy is central to 
originalist thinking about constitutional law.
27 Above all, originalists fear that if judges 
do not follow the original understanding, they will be creating the Constitution anew, 
because they will give it the content of their own choosing. Originalist arguments are not 
always pragmatic in spirit. On the contrary, they can be highly abstract, stressing 
considerations of legitimacy.
28 But some originalists are aware that their approach would 
have dramatic and perhaps intolerable consequences.
29 Inspired by pragmatic 
considerations, they are willing to attempt to reduce that risk.
30 
                                                 
25 Mona Charen, Do-Gooders: How Liberals Hurt Those They Claim to Help (and The Rest of Us) 
(2004). 
26 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note. 
27 See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 Yale LJ 529 (1997). 
28 See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (1985); some of the arguments in Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation, are in the same vein. Consider this passage: “The principal theoretical defect of 
nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of 
constitutionality. . . . I take the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously, and even if one assumes (as many 
nonoriginalists do not even bother to do) that the Constitution was originally meant to expound evolving 
rather than permanent values, . . . I see no basis for believing that supervision of the evolution would have 
been committed to the courts. At an even more general theoretical level, originalism seems to me more 
compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system.” 
29 See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, supra note: “I can be much more brief in describing what seems to me 
the second most serious objection to originalism: In its undiluted form, at least, it is medicine that seems 
too strong to swallow. Thus, almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of state decisis--
so that Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate unassailably 
that it got the meaning of the Constitution wrong. . . . But stare decisis alone is not enough to prevent 
originalism from being what many would consider too bitter a pill. What if some state should enact a new 
law providing public lashing, or branding of the right hand, as punishment for certain criminal offenses? 
Even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, 
and even though no prior Supreme Court decision has specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any 6 
II. Pragmatism, Consequences, and Active Liberty 
 
As a law professor at Harvard Law School, Stephen Breyer specialized in 
administrative law. His important work in that field was marked above all by its 
unmistakably pragmatic foundations.
31 Indeed, one of his major innovations lay in an 
insistence on the importance of evaluating traditional doctrines not in a vacuum, but in 
light of the concrete effects of regulation on the real world.
32 Hence Breyer argued for a 
close connection between administrative law and regulatory policy.
33 While some of his 
work touched on the separation of powers,
34 constitutional law was not his field. But as a 
member of the Supreme Court, Breyer has slowly been developing a distinctive approach 
of his own, one that also has a pragmatic dimension, and that can be seen as directly 
responsive to his colleague Scalia and to originalism.  
This book announces and develops that theory. Its most distinctive feature is its 
effort to connect three seemingly disparate claims. The first is an insistence that judicial 
review can and should be undertaken with close reference to active liberty and to 
democratic goals, a point with clear links to Ely’s work. The second is an emphasis on 
the centrality of “purposes” to legal interpretation, a point rooted in the great legal 
process materials of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks and in particular their brilliant note on 
statutory interpretation.
35 The third is a claim about the need to evaluate theories of legal 
interpretation with close reference to their consequences, a point whose foundations can 
be found in American pragmatism.
36   
As we shall see, much of the interest of Breyer’s book lies in its effort to integrate 
these three claims. I shall be raising questions about that effort, above all on two grounds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
federal judge--even among the many who consider themselves originalists-- would sustain them against an 
eighth amendment challenge.” 
30 Note here that Justice Scalia confesses, “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that 
imposes the punishment of flogging.” See id. 
31 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (1985). 
32 See, e.g., id; Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993). 
33 See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (6
th ed. 2006). Full disclosure: 
I am among the “al.” now working on the book, and hence Breyer and I are, in a formal sense, coauthors. 
But Breyer, otherwise occupied, has not worked on the book since I have joined it. 
34 See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo LJ 785 (1984). 
35 See Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 1340-48 (William Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
eds. 1994) 
36 See William James, Pragmatism (1907). 7 
First, those who emphasize active liberty and democratic self-government might well 
reject a purposive approach to interpretation, including purposive interpretation of the 
Constitution. Second, those who believe in the importance of consequences might well be 
drawn to an approach very different from Breyer’s, including textualism, Thayerism, and 
perhaps even originalism. Breyer’s arguments are unfailingly reasonable; the question is 
whether his general commitments are enough to justify his particular conclusions. Let us 
now turn to some details.  
 
A. Theory 
 
Breyer’s organizing theme is “active liberty,” which he associates with the right 
of self-governance. It is noteworthy that in his own judicial work, Breyer is plausibly 
seen as the most consistently democratic member of the Rehnquist Court: Among its nine 
members, he has shown the highest percentage of votes to uphold acts of Congress
37 and 
also to defer to the decisions of the executive branch.
38 And indeed, a great deal of his 
book is a plea for judicial caution and deference.
39 But Breyer does not mean to follow 
Thayer; he does not say that the Court should uphold legislation whenever the 
Constitution is unclear. Like Ely, Breyer does not rule out the view that courts should 
take an aggressive role in some areas, above all in order to protect democratic governance 
(p. 11). 
His short book comes in three parts. The first builds on Benjamin Constant’s 
famous distinction between the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns (pp. 
3-7).
40 The liberty of the ancients involves “active liberty”—the right to share in the 
exercise of sovereign power. Quoting Constant, Breyer refers to the hope that the sharing 
of that power would “ennoble” the people’s “thoughts and establish among them a kind 
of intellectual equality which forms the glory and power of a free people” (p. 4). But 
Constant also prized negative liberty, meaning “individual independence” from 
government authority. As Breyer describes Constant’s view, which he firmly endorses, it 
                                                 
37 Lori Ringhand, Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court, available on ssrn.com. 
38 See Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas Miles, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2006). 
39 Thus, for example, Breyer favors a deferential approach to campaign finance restrictions and 
affirmative action programs; he also makes a plea for judicial caution in the domain of privacy. 
40 The best discussion remains Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism (1984). 8 
is necessary to have both forms of freedom, and thus “to combine the two together” (p. 
5).
41 
  Breyer believes that the founders of the Constitution did exactly that. His special 
emphasis is on what Constant called “an active and constant participation in public 
power.”
42 That form of participation includes voting, town meetings, and the like; but it 
also requires that citizens receive information and education, in order to promote their 
capacity to ensure effective governance. In Breyer’s view, the citizens of post-
revolutionary America insisted on highly democratic forms of state government, 
promoting popular control. Breyer is aware of the highly ambivalent experiences of post-
revolutionary governments; he know that some commentators have rejected the view that 
the Constitution is a democratic document.
43 Nonetheless, he believes that the founders of 
the Constitution accepted the deepest aspirations of the American Revolution, creating a 
framework with a “basically democratic outlook” (p. 25).  
After all, the document begins with the words, “We the People,” and in Breyer’s 
view, its very structure is a testimonial to active liberty. Both the House and the Senate 
are subject to electoral control. Even with the electoral college, the choice of the 
President is ultimately traceable to voters, not to an unaccountable elite. Breyer thinks 
that the whole system is “difficult to reconcile with a retreat from democratic principle.” 
On the contrary, he claims that the Constitution can be viewed “as focusing first and 
foremost upon ‘active liberty.’” He thinks that constitutional interpretation should be 
undertaken with close reference to that overriding constitutional purpose.
44 
  In Breyer’s account, the Warren Court appreciated active liberty, and it attempted 
to make that form of liberty more real for all Americans (p. 11). By contrast, the 
Rehnquist Court may have pushed the pendulum too far back in the other direction (id.). 
In short, Breyer believes that an appreciation of active liberty has concrete implications 
for a wide range of modern disputes.  
 
                                                 
41 It is not clear that this is, in fact, an adequate account of Constant’s view. See Holmes, supra note. 
42 See also Frank Michelman, Politics and Values or What’s Really Wrong with Rational Basis 
Review, 13 Creighton L Rev 487 (1979). 
43 See, e.g., Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). 
44 As we shall see this claim is best taken, not as purely historical, but as an interpretive claim, one that 
attempts both to fit the document and to place it in the best constructive light. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (1985). 9 
B. Applications 
 
The second part of his book traces those implications. He begins with free speech. 
An obvious question is whether the Court should be hostile or receptive to campaign 
finance reform. With his eye directly on the democratic ball, Breyer suggests that if we 
focus on the “the Constitution’s basic structural objective, ‘participatory self-
government’” (p. 46), then we will be receptive to restrictions on campaign contributions. 
A central reason is that such restrictions “seek to democratize the influence that money 
can bring upon the electoral process” (p. 47). He thinks that some of his colleague s, most 
prominently Rehnquist and Scalia, have been quite mistaken to invoke negative liberty as 
a rigid barrier to campaign finance restrictions. In the same vein, he insists that the free 
speech principle, seen in terms of active liberty, gives special protection to political 
speech, and significantly less protection to commercial advertising. He criticizes his 
colleagues on the Court for protecting advertising with the aggressiveness that they have 
shown in recent years. His purposive interpretation of freedom of speech thus emphasizes 
democratic self-government above all.
45 
  Affirmative action might seem to have little to do with active liberty. At first 
glance, it poses a conflict between the ideal of color-blindness and what Breyer calls a 
“narrowly purposive” (p. 80) understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, one that 
emphasizes the historical mistreatment of African-Americans. Directly disagreeing with 
some of his colleagues,
46 Breyer endorses the narrowly purposive approach. But he also 
contends that in permitting affirmative action at educational institutions, the Court has 
been centrally concerned with democratic self-government. The reason, pragmatic in 
character, is that “some form of affirmative action” is “necessary to maintain a well-
functioning participatory democracy” (p. 81). Breyer points to the Court’s emphasis on 
the role of broad access to education in “sustaining our political and cultural heritage” 
and in promoting diverse leadership. Underlining those points, Breyer argues that the 
Court’s decision to permit affirmative action made a direct appeal “to principles of 
fraternity , to principles of active liberty” (p. 82). In Breyer’s view, it should be no 
                                                 
45 In this way he seems to follow Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-
Government (1948); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993), is in the same 
general vein. 
46 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 10 
surprise that the Court selected an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that 
would, as a pragmatic matter, promote rather than undermine the operation of democracy. 
As serious problem with the attack on affirmative action is that it would produce 
intolerable consequences. 
With respect to privacy, Breyer’s emphasis is on the novelty of new technologies 
and the rise of unanticipated questions about how to balance law enforcement needs 
against the interest in keeping personal information private. Because of the difficulty of 
those problems, Breyer argues, on pragmatic grounds, for “a special degree of judicial 
modesty and caution.” He wants to avoid a “premature judicial decision” that would risk 
“short-circuiting, or pre-empting, the ‘conversational law-making process.” Hence his 
plea is for narrow, cautious judicial rulings that do not lay out long-term solutions. In 
Breyer’s view, such rulings serve active liberty, because they refuse to “limit legislative 
options in ways now unforeseeable.” By its very nature, a narrow ruling is unlikely to 
“interfere with any ongoing democratic policy debate.” His argument here is important, 
because other members of the Court, most notably Scalia, have objected to narrow 
rulings on the ground that they leave too much uncertainty for the future.
47 
Some of the most noteworthy decisions of the Rehnquist Court have attempted to 
limit the power of Congress.
 48 For example, the Court has struck down the Violence 
Against Women Act as beyond congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.
49 It 
has also announced an “anti-commandeering” principle, one that forbids the national 
government from requiring state legislatures to enact laws.
50 In the abstract, those 
decisions seem to promote active liberty, because they decrease the authority of the more 
remote national government, and because they promote participation and self-government 
at the local level. Breyer is no critic of federalism or defender of centralized government. 
He agrees that the federal system fits with his general theme, because that system makes 
“it easier for citizens to hold government officials accountable” and because it brings 
“government closer to home.”  
 
                                                 
47 See, e.g. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989). 
48 United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000). 
49 Id 
50 New York v US, 505 US 144 (1992). 11 
Nonetheless, he strongly objects to the Court’s recent federalism decisions. With 
respect to congressional enactments, “the public has participated in the legislative process 
at the national level, ” and hence active liberty calls for deference by the Court. Breyer’s 
special target is the anti-commandeering principle. Speaking in heavily pragmatic terms, 
Breyer thinks that this prohibition prevents valuable national initiatives to protect against 
terrorism, environmental degradation, and natural disasters—initiatives in which, for 
example, the national government requires state officials to ensure compliance with 
federal standards (p. 60).  
  Breyer also contends that an understanding of active liberty can inform more 
technical debates. Here is a prominent example: In Chevron v. NRDC,
51 the Court 
announced a principle of deference to administrative interpretations of law. The Court 
ruled that in the face of statutory ambiguity, courts should defer to agency interpretations 
so long as they are reasonable. Breyer believes that this approach is too simple and too 
crude, in a way that disserves democracy itself.
52 When the agency has solved an 
interstitial question, Breyer believes that judicial deference is appropriate, because 
deference is what a reasonable legislature would want. But on “questions of major 
importance” (p. 107), involving the fundamental reach or nature of the statute, Breyer 
thinks that a reasonable legislature would not want courts to accept the agency’s 
interpretation. He thus urges that courts should take a firmer hand in reviewing agency 
judgments on fundamental matters than in reviewing more routine matters. Here too, he 
opposes Justice Scalia, who endorses a broad reading of Chevron, one that would 
generally defer to agency interpretations of law.
53 In democracy’s name, Breyer argues 
on behalf of independent judicial review of agency interpretations involving major 
national questions. 
There is a larger interpretive question in the background. Should courts rely only 
on a statute’s literal text, or should they place an emphasis instead “on statutory purpose 
and congressional intent”? Sharply disagreeing with the more textually-oriented Scalia,
54 
                                                 
51 467 US 837 (1984).  
52 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363 (1986); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, Va L Rev (forthcoming). 
53 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke LJ 511; United 
States v. Mead, 533 US 218 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note. 12 
and again emphasizing pragmatic considerations, Breyer favors purpose and intent. Here 
he is evidently influenced by the famous legal process materials, compiled by Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks; as I have noted, those materials place “purpose” front and center, and 
they also insist that courts should assume that legislators are “reasonable people acting 
reasonably.”
55 In the same vein, Breyer emphasizes that a purpose-based approach asks 
courts to consider the goals of “the ‘reasonable Member of Congress’—a legal fiction 
that applies, for example, even when Congress did not in fact consider a particular 
problem.”
56  
In defending this approach, Breyer speaks in thoroughly pragmatic terms, 
emphasizing the beneficial consequences of purposivism. Breyer thinks that as compared 
with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more 
sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it “helps to implement the public’s 
will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.” Breyer 
concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose “means that laws will work better for 
the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life; and a failure to 
understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law 
seeks to benefit” (p. 100). Thus Breyer directly links active liberty, purposive approaches 
to law, and an emphasis on consequences. 
  The third part of Breyer’s book tackles the broadest questions of interpretive 
theory and directly engages Scalia’s contrary view. Breyer explicitly emphasizes that he 
means to draw attention to purposes and consequences above all. Constitutional 
provisions, he thinks, have “certain basic purposes,” and they should be understood in 
light of those purposes and the broader democratic goals that infuse the Constitution as a 
whole. In addition, consequences are “an important yardstick to ensure a given 
interpretation’s faithfulness to these democratic purposes.” Breyer is fully aware that 
many people, including his colleagues Scalia and Thomas, are drawn to “textualism” and 
its close cousin “originalism”—approaches that argue in favor close attention to the 
                                                 
55 See Hart and Sacks, supra note, at 1380. 
56 See the powerful note, emphasizing this point and what the authors saw as the centrality of purpose, 
in Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 1374-1380 (William Eskridge and Philip Frickey eds. 
1994). Thus Hart and Sacks offer “A Concise Statement of the Task,” which begins, “Decide what purpose 
ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved,” id at 
1374, and add that a court “should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature 
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable goals reasonably,” id. at 1378. 13 
meaning of legal terms at the time that were enacted. Scalia , Thomas, and their followers 
are likely to think that Breyer’s approach is an invitation for open-ended judicial 
lawmaking, in a way that compromises his own democratic aspirations.
57 But he offers 
several responses. 
  First, originalist judges claim to follow history, but they cannot easily 
demonstrate that history in fact favors their preferred method. The Constitution does not 
say that it should be interpreted to mean what it meant when it was ratified. The 
document itself enshrines no particular theory of interpretation; it does not mandate 
originalism. And if originalism cannot be defended by reference to the intentions and 
understandings of the framers, Breyer asks, in what way can it be defended—“other than 
in an appeal to consequences?” He points out that the most sophisticated originalists 
ultimately argue that their approach will have good consequences—by, for example, 
stabilizing the law and deterring judges from imposing their own views. Even Breyer’s 
originalist adversaries are “consequentialist in an important sense” (p. 118). They are not 
consequentialists in particular cases, but they adopt, and defend, their preferred approach 
on consequentialist grounds.
58 
  Breyer’s second argument is that his own approach does not leave courts at sea, 
for he too insists that judges must take account of “the legal precedents, rules, standards, 
practices, and institutional understanding that a decision will affect.” Those who focus on 
consequences will not favor frequent or dramatic legal change, simply because stability is 
important. In any case textualism and originalism cannot avoid the problem of judicial 
discretion. “Which historical account shall we use? Which tradition shall we apply?” (p. 
127). In the end, Breyer contends that the real problem with textualism and originalism is 
that they “may themselves produce seriously harmful consequences—outweighing 
whatever risks of subjectivity or uncertainty [are] inherent in other approaches” (p. 129). 
His pragmatic goal is “a form of democratic government that will prove workable over 
                                                 
57 See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note. 
58 See id; see also the candid suggestion by Randy Barnett, a self-described originalist, see Randy 
Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (2004): “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, originalists 
maintain that better results will be reached overall if government officials—including judges—must stick 
to the original meaning rather than empowering them to trump that meaning with one that they prefer,” 
available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp (emphasis added). 14 
time,” and he believes that his kind of purposive approach, rooted in active liberty, is 
most likely to promote that goal.  
 
III. Characterizing Purposes or Ensuring Active Liberty? Some Pragmatic 
Questions 
 
  This is a brisk, lucid, and energetic book, written with conviction and offering a 
central argument that is at once provocative and appealing. It is not usual for a member of 
the Supreme Court to attempt to set out a general approach to his job; Breyer’s effort 
must be ranked among the very few most impressive such efforts in the nation’s long 
history. And in defending a pragmatic, purposive-oriented alternative to originalism, 
Breyer writes in a way that is unfailingly civil and generous to those who disagree with 
him—and thus provides a model for how respectful argument might occur, even in a 
domain that is intensely polarized.  
A large difficulty, as we shall soon see, lies in the characterization of purposes, 
both in particular cases and in general. Texts rarely announce their own purposes; the 
same is true of the Constitution itself. When Breyer asks judges to identity the purposes 
of reasonable legislators, he is inviting a degree of judicial discretion in the judgment of 
what purposes are reasonable. And while he is not wrong to say that “active liberty” 
helped inform the founding document, his own characterization of its purposes has a 
strong evaluative element. The same is true for the effort to bring active liberty to bear on 
concrete cases.  
There is a further point. Breyer emphasizes consequences, and rightly so. But 
those who think that consequences are important might well end up favoring approaches 
that he rejects, such as textualism, judicial deference to legislative judgments,
59 respect 
for agency interpretations of law, and even originalism. To be sure, consequences cannot 
be assessed without some theory of value, and Breyer wants to use active liberty as part 
of the standard for assessment. But it is both to impossible both to use active liberty as 
the basis for evaluating consequences and to think that courts do best if they follow the 
ordinary meaning of statutory texts, or defer to agency interpretations of the most 
important questions, or uphold legislation unless it is plainly unconstitutional.  
                                                 
59 For a consequentialist defense of such deference, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 
(forthcoming 2006. 15 
I do not believe that these are decisive objections to Breyer’s particular 
conclusions or even to his general approach. But they suggest that the defense of those 
conclusions, and of that approach, must be cast in a way that acknowledges that much of 
the time, reasonable purposes are made, not found. And on both pragmatic and 
democratic grounds, that acknowledgement raises some questions about the search for 
purposes by the federal judiciary. It is possible that we are all pragmatists now.
60 If so, 
the problem is that many different approaches, and not only Breyer’s, can march under 
the pragmatic banner.
61 Breyer does not give adequate attention to the possibility that 
alternative approaches, especially in the domains of statutory interpretation and 
administrative law, might be powerfully defended on the very grounds that Breyer 
invokes. 
 
A.  Originalism and Consequences 
 
Breyer’s specific conclusions do make a great deal of sense; they are eminently 
reasonable. In the domain of personal privacy, for example, the Court should be aware of 
how little it knows about current technological developments, and narrow rulings have 
the valuable feature of avoiding premature solutions.
62 In general, Breyer makes a 
sensible plea for judicial restraint, and it is most illuminating to hear that plea from one of 
the Court’s “liberals.” Indeed, Breyer’s survey of particular areas is unified by a general 
theme, which involves the need for courts to respect democratic prerogatives. But his 
largest claim is more general still: Any approach to legal interpretation must be defended 
                                                 
60 Note in this connection that Judge Richard Posner is a famous pragmatist, and his own approach to 
law is very different from Justice Breyer’s, certainly insofar as Posner does not stress citizen participation 
or active liberty. See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 57-96 (2003); Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword, Harv L Rev (forthcoming 2005). Posner describes his own position as “everyday 
pragmatism,” id. at 24-25, 49-56, as distinguished from philosophical pragmatism, and Posner tries to avoid 
theoretically ambitious claims. He describes everyday pragmatism as “the untheorized cultural outlook of 
most Americans, one rooted in the usages and attitudes of a brash, fast-moving, competitive, forward-
looking, commercial, materialistic, philistine society, with its emphasis on working hard and getting 
ahead.” An obvious objection to “untheorized” pragmatism is that it is not possible to evaluate 
consequences without a contested judgment of value; and Posner’s own description of the “untheoretized 
culture outlook of most Americans” does suggest some kind of theoretical position. But this objection 
should not be overstated. It is often possible, however, for people to make a particular evaluation of 
consequences amidst disagreement or uncertainty about foundational questions. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).   
61 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (forthcoming 2006), which defends a form 
of Thayerism on pragmatic grounds. 
62 See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale LJ 1743 (1995). 16 
in a way that plays close attention to its consequences. Despite its simplicity, this 
pragmatic point continues to be widely ignored. It has particular implications for the 
analysis of originalism.  
Of course there is a lively historical dispute about whether those who ratified the 
Constitution meant to hold posterity to their specific views.
63 If the ratifiers did not want 
to bind posterity to their particular understandings, originalism stands defeated on its own 
premises: The original understanding may have been that the original understanding is 
not binding. Breyer properly notes this possibility (p. 117), and if the historical record 
shows that the ratifiers rejected originalism, the argument for originalism is self-
defeating. But suppose that the ratifiers had no clear view on that question, or even that 
the better understanding is that they did, in fact, want to hold posterity to their 
understandings.
64 Even if so, it is up to us, and not to them, to decide whether to follow 
those views. It would be circular and therefore unhelpful to defend reliance on the 
ratifiers’ specific views on the ground that the ratifiers wanted us to respect their specific 
views.  
It follows that the question whether originalism is a sensible approach to 
constitutional law must be answered by reference to its consequences.
65 Suppose that the 
consequence of originalism would be to threaten many contemporary rights and 
understandings. If so, why should we accept it
66? And indeed it does seem probable that 
originalism would have this consequence. For example, it would likely mean that the 
national government could discriminate on the basis of race and sex, simply because the 
equal protection clause does not apply to the national government at all. Originalism 
would almost certainly authorize states to discriminate on the basis of sex, which the 
equal protection clause was not originally understood to forbid. Originalism might well 
mean that Brown v. Bd of Education was wrongly decided
67; it would almost certainly 
                                                 
63 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U Chi L Rev 519 (2003); H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 99 Harv L Rev 885 (1985). 
64 See Nelson, supra note. 
65 Of course any evaluation of consequences must be value-laden, a point taken up below. 
66 See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan L Rev 1365 (1990). 
67 The reason is that it is not easy to find, in the fourteenth amendment, a specific understanding that 
any relevant clause banned segregation. See Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of the Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 1972 Wash Q L Rev 421, 460-62; R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 123-125 
(1977); A. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv L Rev 1, 11-40 
(1955). For a counterargument, see Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 17 
eliminate the right of privacy altogether, simply because there is no such right in the 
document, and it is hard to show that the original understanding of any relevant provision 
supports the privacy right. And many originalists firmly believe that their approach 
would require courts to invalidate a great deal of legislation—by, for example, striking 
down independent regulatory agencies,
68 forbidding Congress from delegating discretion 
to regulatory agencies,
69 and imposing new limitations on national power under the 
commerce clause.
70 
I do not mean to say that the originalist method necessarily compels all of these 
conclusions; the interpretive questions are complex, not simple. And even if originalism 
has these consequences, some originalists candidly acknowledge that established 
precedent has its claims, and that it must sometimes be respected even if it deviates from 
the original understanding. Justice Scalia, for example, says that he might well be a 
“faint-hearted” originalist,
71 because he is willing to follow precedent even when he 
believes that it is wrong in principle.
72 My only point is that Breyer is correct to note that 
the document itself does not require originalism and to argue that consequences matter to 
the choice of a theory of interpretation—and to insist that if we care about consequences, 
the argument for originalism looks increasingly implausible.
73 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Va L Rev 947 (1995). McConnell impressively shows that many members of Congress believed that under 
section five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress had the authority to abolish segregation. But it is one 
thing to say that many members of Congress so believed, and expressed that view in unenacted legislation; 
it is quite another thing to say that the fourteenth amendment was understood to create a self-executing, 
judicial enforceable ban on segregation. 
68 Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Law, 104 Yale LJ 541 
(1994). 
69 Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to be Constitutional, 53 F 
Comm LJ 427 (2001). 
70 See Raich v. Ashcroft, US (Thomas, J., dissenting); Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the 
Commerce Clause, 73 Va L Rev 1387 (1987); Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (2003); 
Douglas Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, Cato Supreme Court Review 7 (2003). 
71 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note. 
72 Scalia has said that Thomas “doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.” Scalia remarks, “if a 
constitutional authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say, ‘Let’s get it right.’ I wouldn’t do that.” Quoted in 
Stephen Presser, Touting Thomas, Legal Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2005). 
73 There are other problems, including the arguable incoherence of the originalist enterprise. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes (2005). 18 
B. Second-Order Pragmatism? Of Purposes and Texts 
 
Breyer offers a sketch, not a sustained argument, and he leaves significant gaps. 
Above all, he says too little about the difficulties that judges face in assessing 
consequences and in describing purposes. We can describe this as a pragmatic objection 
to his approach—an objection that might argue in favor of second-order pragmatism, that 
is, a form of pragmatism that is alert to institutional considerations.
74 Let us begin with 
some technical issues.  
Recall that Breyer argues against a broad reading of Chevron; he believes that for 
major questions, courts should make an independent assessment of statutory meaning, 
and not defer to reasonable interpretations by the executive branch. But why? The answer 
appears to be that reasonable legislators would want courts to assume an independent role 
(p. 106). But is this so clear? Assume that a statute—say, the Endangered Species Act, or 
the Food and Drug Act—contains an ambiguous provision on an issue of national 
importance. Might not reasonable legislators want a specialized, accountable agency to 
resolve the ambiguity, even on major questions?  
On pragmatic grounds, it might be thought that resolution of the ambiguity often 
calls for a difficult policy judgment, and reasonable legislatures might not want difficult 
policy judgments to be made by federal courts.
75 On consequentialist grounds, consider 
the following fact: In reviewing agency interpretations of law, Republican appointees to 
the federal bench show a definite “tilt” in a conservative direction, and Democratic 
appointees should a definite “tilt” in a liberal direction.
76 Why would we think that a 
reasonable legislator would want statutory ambiguities to be resolved in accordance with 
whatever “tilt” can be found on the relevant reviewing court? Or consider an additional 
fact: A more refined approach to Chevron, of the sort that Breyer celebrates, has 
                                                 
74 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, forthcoming; Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule, Institutions and Interpretation, 101 Mich L Rev 885 (2003). 
75 This argument is spelled out in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s 
Power to Interpret the Law, Yale LJ (forthcoming). 
76 See id; Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas Miles, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, U Chi L Rev (forthcoming). 19 
produced a great deal of confusion in the lower courts.
77 Does pragmatism support that 
outcome? 
 In short, it is not clear that in this context, Breyer has properly identified the 
(hypothetical, constructed) instructions of a reasonable legislator; but the important point 
is far more general. For interpreting statutes, Breyer follows Hart and Sacks in arguing in 
favor of close attention to purposes, understood as the objectives of a “reasonable 
legislator.” Sometimes this approach is indeed useful, especially where there is a 
consensus on what reasonableness requires.
78 But Hart and Sacks, writing in the 
consensus-pervaded (and complacent) legal culture of the 1950s, downplayed the 
possibility that disagreement, highly ideological in nature, would break out on that 
question. In the current period, it should be obvious that different judges may well 
disagree about what a reasonable legislator would like to do. Imagine that a law 
condemns “discrimination on the basis of sex”; suppose that a state adopts a height and 
weight requirement for police officers, one that excludes far more women than men. In 
deciding whether this requirement is “discrimination,” how shall judges characterize the 
purpose of a reasonable legislator? It is inevitable that courts will see their own preferred 
view as reasonable. Does that promote active liberty? Does pragmatism support a 
situation in which judges assess reasonableness by their own lights? 
Unfortunately, the problem is common. Laws rarely come with clear 
announcements of their purposes, and in hard cases, any characterization requires some 
kind of evaluative judgment from courts. It is not a matter of finding something. Suppose 
that the antidiscrimination statute is invoked against affirmative action programs.
79 Does 
the purpose of the ban on “discrimination” argue for, or against, such programs? It would 
be easy to characterize the purpose as the elimination of any consideration of race from 
the relevant domain; it would also be easy to characterize the purpose as the protection of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups.
80 If judges are asked to say what “reasonable” 
                                                 
77 See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo Wash L Rev 347 (2003); Lisa Bressman, 
Vanderbilt L Rev (forthcoming). 
78 Examples are given in Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 So. Cal. L. Rev.845 (1992). 
79 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979). 
80 See Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A Matter of Principle 316 (1985).  20 
legislators would like to do, they are all too likely to say what they themselves would like 
to do. 
Hart and Sacks, Breyer’s predecessors, do offer a powerful and sensible approach 
to statutory interpretation, but they devote too little attention to the problem of 
characterizing purpose. When courts choose one purpose over another (reasonable) 
candidate, they are actually attempting to put the relevant text in the best constructive 
light.
81  Of course they are selecting an interpretation that fits the text and context; if they 
were not doing that, they would not be engaging in interpretation at all. But when they 
select a reasonable purpose, they are choosing an approach that, by their own lights, 
makes the best sense. A judicial judgment on this count is hardly untethered—that would 
be a caricature—but it is a judicial judgment nonetheless.  
Many textualists distrust resort to purposes for this very reason. Emphasizing the 
increasing substitution of statutes for the common law, they want courts to hew closely to 
statutory language.
82 They think that judges have paid too little attention to the rise of 
statutory lawmaking, and have used common law approaches, including analogical 
reasoning, in domains where they do not belong.
83 And indeed, the Hart and Sacks 
materials might well be understood as a product of an early confrontation between 
common law thinking and a system of law that is pervaded by statutory interventions. 
Justice Scalia believes that an emphasis on the plain meaning of the text, which is what 
after all has been enacted, promotes democratic responsibility and also helps to discipline 
the judiciary.
84  
If purpose is being characterized in a way that defies the ordinary meaning of the 
text, Scalia’s argument has considerable pragmatic force. Indeed, textualism might easily 
be defended with reference to active liberty, and in two different ways. First, textualism 
promotes democratic government, by encouraging the legislature to make its instructions 
clear. Over time, a text-oriented judiciary might well promote better accountability from 
                                                 
81 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). 
82 See Scalia, supra note. 
83 Id. 
84 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note.  21 
legislatures. Second, textualism disciplines judicial creation of “intentions” and 
“purposes” to push statutes in judicially preferred directions.
85  
To be sure, it is easy to overstate the constraints imposed by text. Where the text 
is ambiguous, or leaves gaps, textualism by hypothesis is inadequate, and some other 
interpretive tool must be invoked.
86 There is a serious risks that in hard cases, preferences 
are likely to matter for textualists as for everyone all else.
87 My only suggestion is that 
Breyer pays too little attention to the risk that any judgments about “reasonableness” will 
be the judges’ own, in a way that disserves democracy itself.  
Breyer is correct to say that any theory of interpretation has to be defended in 
terms of its consequences. But for interpreting statutes, it is not at all clear that a purpose-
based approach, focusing on consequences in particular cases, is preferable to a text-
based approach, one that asks judges not to think little or not at all about consequences. A 
textual approach might be simpler to apply; if so, that is surely a point in its favor. And if 
judges cannot reliably identify reasonable purposes, textualism might also lead to better 
results, or consequences, all things considered.
88  
None of this means that Scalia’s approach is necessarily superior to Breyer’s. But 
it does point out the necessity of engaging the possibility that on his own consequentialist 
grounds, and with an eye firmly on democratic goals, textualism in the interpretation of 
                                                 
85 Note in this regard the very different reaction of German and Italian judges to the emergence of 
fascism. German judges proceeded in a purposive fashion, abandoning text in favor of legislative goals 
(and consequences!) – in a way that promoted injustice an even atrocity. See Ingo Muller, Hitler’s Justice: 
The Courts of the Third Reich(1991). By contrast, the Italian judges made close attention to text and to 
plain meaning, in a way that produced much better consequences. See Guido Calabresi, Two Functions of 
Formalism, 67 U Chi L Rev 479 (2000), and in particular this suggestion: “To the scholars opposing 
Fascism, the nineteenth-century self-contained formalistic system became a great weapon. . . . What it 
conserved was the liberal, nineteenth century political approach . . . [and] in a time of Fascism, the 
important thing was that it conserved basic democratic attitudes.” Id. at 482.  
86 Consider, for example, the rule of lenity, invoked in Smith v. US, 508 US 223 (1999) (Scalia, J, 
dissenting). 
87 Evidence can be found in Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Interpret 
the Law; Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas Miles, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, U Chi L Rev. 
88 Some people appear to believe that interpretation, to count as such, necessarily calls for attention to 
the “intent” of those who wrote the text in question. See, e.g., Stanley Fish [citation to be added]. This is a 
blunder. In law, it is certainly possible to interpret texts by pointing to the ordinary meaning of the words, 
without speculating about authorial intentions. Whether this is desirable as well as possible is another 
question, one that must be resolved by reference, among other things, to consequences. 22 
ordinary statutes might be better than an approach that explores purposes.
89 Of course 
textualism is sometimes a fake, as when the text does not have any clear meaning. In my 
view, hard cases, in which the text is indeterminate, are best resolved with clear reference 
to the views of any applicable administrative agency, and also with close attention to 
pertinent canons of construction—which, properly used, discipline the exercise of judicial 
discretion and also serve the system of separated powers.
90 But this is not the place to 
defend that view. The only point is that Breyer has not shown that a purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation is unambiguously preferable to the reasonable alternatives. 
 
C. Active Liberty As an Interpretive Tool 
 
Breyer is right to say that the framers wanted to recognize both active liberty and 
negative liberty. But the framers saw themselves as republicans, not as democrats,
91 and 
they did not believe in participatory democracy or in rule through town meetings. On this 
count, Breyer slides quickly over intense debates about what the American framers 
actually sought to do.
92 Of course they attempted to provide a framework for a form of 
self-government.
93 But so stated, that goal operates at an exceedingly high level of 
abstraction, one that cannot easily be brought to bear on concrete cases. Much of the 
time, it is hard to link the general idea of self-government to particular judgments about 
contemporary disputes in constitutional law.  
Certainly Breyer does not try to argue, in originalist fashion, that the actual 
drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution wanted to allow campaign finance reform, 
restrictions on commercial advertising, affirmative action programs, and federal 
commandeering of state government. He argues instead that the idea of active liberty, 
which animates the Constitution, helps to justify these judgments. This is reasonable 
enough. But exactly what kind of argument is it? The framers of the Constitution also 
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placed a high premium on “domestic tranquility,” to which the preamble explicitly refers. 
Would it be right to say that because domestic tranquility is a central goal of the 
document, the President is permitted to ban dangerous speech—or that because, or if, 
affirmative action threatens to divide the races, in a way that compromises “tranquility,” 
color-blindness is the right principle after all?  
In any case Breyer rightly emphasizes that the Constitution attempts to protect 
negative liberty too. Why shouldn’t a ban on campaign finance restrictions be seen to run 
afoul of that goal? Nor is negative liberty the only value at stake. Such restrictions forbid 
people from spending their money on political campaigns, in a way that might well be 
taken to compromise participatory self-government. In this light we might well see 
campaign finance restrictions as offending, at once, both negative and active liberty. 
Deductive logic cannot take us from an acknowledgement of the importance of active 
liberty to acceptance of campaign finance restrictions; there are no syllogisms here. 
Instead an evaluative judgment must be made, to the effect that properly characterized, 
the first amendment and its goal of self-government do not condemn (the relevant) 
restriction on campaign contributions and expenditures. I believe that this conclusion is 
broadly correct, especially when we consider the general need for courts to defer to 
congressional judgments in hard cases.
94 But the evaluative judgment is inescapable.  
Or suppose that we accept, as we should, Breyer’s claims about the centrality of 
active liberty to the constitutional design. Is originalism therefore off the table? Not at all. 
We might believe, with some constitutional theorists (including Alexander Hamilton
95), 
that constitutional provisions, as products of an engaged citizenry, reflect the will of We 
the People, as ordinary legislation usually does not. If so, an emphasis on the original 
understanding can be taken to serve active liberty at the same time that it promotes 
negative liberty. It serves active liberty because it follows the specific judgments of an 
engaged citizenry. It promotes negative liberty because and precisely to the extent that 
those judgments favor negative liberty (or for that matter active liberty). I do not mean to 
suggest that this argument is convincing. The framers and ratifiers included only a small 
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segment of early America, and in any case the fact that the framers and ratifiers are long 
dead creates serious problems for those who argue for originalism in democracy’s name. 
The only point is that Breyer’s emphasis on active liberty does not rule originalism out of 
bounds. 
Or return to Thayer’s claim that the Court should strike down legislation only if it 
clearly and unambiguously violates the Constitution. Despite his general enthusiasm for 
restraint, Breyer does not mean to follow Thayer. But why not? Thayer and his followers 
can claim to favor active liberty, because they allow the sovereign people to do as they 
choose. Indeed, Learned Hand, an apostle of judicial restraint, wanted courts to be 
reluctant to invalidate legislation in large part because he was committed democratic self-
rule.
96 Perhaps Breyer thinks that this approach undervalues both negative and active 
liberty. But why? Perhaps a deferential Court will ultimately produce exactly the right 
mix between the two kinds of freedom. Of course Ely’s approach, emphasizing 
reinforcement of democratic processes, can easily be rooted in active liberty; indeed, 
active liberty lies at its heart. Breyer writes approvingly of the Warren Court on the 
ground that its decisions promoted active liberty (p. 11); and Ely is the Warren Court’s 
most systematic defender. Does Breyer mean to endorse Ely? If not, where does he 
differ? A puzzling gap in Breyer’s book is the omission of any treatment of Ely’s 
apparently similar argument.
97  
Recall that Breyer candidly acknowledges that legislative “purpose” is not 
something that can simply be found. “Purpose” is what judges attribute to the legislature, 
based on their own conception of what reasonable legislators would mean to do. If this is 
true for the purposes of individual statutes, it is also true for the purposes of the 
Constitution as well. When Breyer says that the “basic” purpose of the Constitution is to 
protect active liberty, so as to produce concrete conclusions on disputed questions, his 
own judgments about the goals of a reasonable constitution-maker are playing a central 
role. Fortunately, Breyer’s own judgments are indeed reasonable. But he underplays the 
extent to which they are his own. 
                                                 
96 See Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (Irving Dillard ed. 1960)/ 
97 There is only one reference to Ely, presaged by “cf” see p. 1146. Note also that Frank Michelman 
has made closely related arguments. See Frank Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev. 4 
(1986). 25 
The same point bears on Breyer’s enthusiasm for an inquiry into consequences. 
Consequences certainly do matter, but much of the time, it is impossible to assess 
consequences without reference to disputed questions of value. Return to the question of 
affirmative action, and suppose, rightly, that the text of the Constitution could, but need 
not, be understood to require color-blindness. If we care about consequences, will we 
accept the color-blindness principle or not? Suppose we believe that affirmative action 
programs create racial divisiveness and increase the risk that underqualified people will 
placed in important positions. If those are bad consequences, perhaps we will oppose 
affirmative action programs. An emphasis on consequences as such is only a start. Of 
course Breyer is not concerned with consequences alone; he wants to understand them 
with close reference to specified purposes, above all “active liberty.” But as I have 
suggested, that idea, taken in the abstract, is compatible with a range of different 
approaches to constitutional law; it need not be taken to compel Breyer’s own approach. 
None of this means that Breyer is wrong. On the contrary, I believe that he is 
largely right. He is right to say that the free speech principle should be understood to 
democratic terms. He is right to say that where the Court lacks important information, it 
should rule cautiously and narrowly. He is right to resist the constitutional assault on 
affirmative action programs (an assault that, by the way, is extremely hard to defend in 
originalist terms
98). He is right to reject originalism. Above all, he is right to emphasize 
the importance of democratic goals to constitutional interpretation.  
But to make his argument convincing, he would have to offer a more sustained 
encounter between his own approach and the imaginable alternatives. Essentially for 
Breyer’s own reasons, originalism does seem unacceptable, certainly if it is 
unaccompanied by respect for precedent; and it is not clear if originalism, so 
accompanied, can be made coherent. Bipartisan restraint, of the sort championed by 
Thayer and Holmes, has many attractions, and the Court should probably move toward it 
in some areas
99; but in too many contexts, it too would destabilize our rights and our 
institutions. For the evaluation of a democracy-centered approach to constitutional law, a 
great deal depends on whether courts will often wield democratic ideals as a sword 
                                                 
98 See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
71 Va L Rev. 753 (1985). 
99 See Vermeule, supra note. 26 
against our actual democracy (as Ely urged), or whether they will more frequently use 
those ideals as a shield against constitutional attacks (as Breyer appears to urge). A great 
deal also depends on our degree of trust in those who wield those ideals, and their likely 
reasonableness.  
A deeper point lies in the background here. For the selection of a general theory 
of interpretation, a great deal turns on context. I have argued against originalism, but it is 
possible to imagine a world in which originalism would make a great deal of sense. 
Suppose, for example, that the original public meaning of the founding document would 
generally or always produce sensible results; that violations of the original public 
meaning would be unjust or otherwise unacceptable; that democratic processes that did 
not violate the original public meaning would not cause serious problems from the 
standpoint of justice or otherwise; and that judges, not following the original public 
meaning, would produce terrible blunders from the appropriate point of view. In such a 
world, originalism would be the best approach to follow. I have argued against bipartisan 
restraint. But in a world in which democratic processes were systematically reliable, and 
in which unrestrained judges would use ambiguous provisions of the Constitution to 
impose unjust or otherwise unsupportable policies, the argument for bipartisan restraint 
would be very strong. The larger point is that the Constitution itself does not contain a 
theory of interpretation, and no single theory would make sense in every imaginable 
world.  
It is also possible to doubt whether the Supreme Court should accept any 
ambitious or unitary theory of interpretation.
100 Perhaps the Court does best, in our actual 
world, if it avoids ambitious accounts, and decides cases, if it can, with reference to 
reasons that can command agreement from those with diverse views about foundational 
questions, and from those who do not want to take a stand on those questions. Perhaps a 
commitment to “active liberty” is too sectarian to command general assent. But at least 
this much can be said on Breyer’s behalf: If an ambitious account is desirable, 
indispensable, or unavoidable, an emphasis on the commitment to democratic rule is 
hardly the worst place to start. 
                                                 
100 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733 (1995); Cass R. 
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Conclusion 
 
   Within the Supreme Court itself, the most powerful recent theoretical arguments 
have come from Justice Scalia, with his insistence on originalism and his complaint that 
if courts are not bound by the original understanding, they are essentially doing whatever 
they want.
101 Breyer has now developed a distinctive argument of his own, one that 
demonstrates the possibility of a nonoriginalist method that, while not eliminating 
discretion, is hardly a blank check to the judiciary. Breyer’s originality lies in the effort to 
forge links among its three distinctive moving parts: an appreciation of “active liberty” 
and its place in our constitutional tradition; a commitment to purposive understandings of 
interpretation; and an insistence, inspired by American pragmatism, that theories of 
interpretation must be evaluated in terms of their consequences.  
  I have emphasized what seems to me a central problem in Breyer’s account: the 
difficulty of characterizing purposes, and of counting purposes as “reasonable,” without a 
judgment of the interpreter’s own. In hard cases, judgments about purpose are evaluative, 
not descriptive.
102 What is true for particular provisions is true for the founding document 
as a whole. Active liberty is certainly a theme of the document, but it is not easy to 
deduce, from that theme, particular conclusions about the legal issues raised campaign 
finance restrictions, affirmative action plans, privacy, and judicial review of agency 
action. Nor does active liberty, standing alone, make the choice between textual and 
purposive approaches to constitutional interpretation. On purely pragmatic grounds, 
purposive approaches run into serious problems once we acknowledge the role of judicial 
discretion in the characterization of purposes.
103  
I have also suggested the possibility of endorsing a kind of second-order 
pragmatism, one that attempts to develop tools to discipline the judicial inquiry into both 
consequences and purposes. Perhaps we are all pragmatists now, in the sense that we can 
agree that any theory of interpretation must pay close attention to the outcomes that it 
                                                 
101 See Scalia, supra note. 
102 This point is emphasized and not deplored in Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note; Insofar as he 
emphasizes the constructive element in interpretation, Dworkin seems to me to make a large advance on 
Hart and Sacks, whose approach resembles his. 
103 Cf. Vermeule, supra note. 28 
produces.
104 Whether or not we do agree on that point, we certainly should. The problem 
is that many diverse views can march under the pragmatic banner. 
But if Breyer’s particular conclusions are not compelled by his general themes, 
they are always plausible, and usually more than that. Many originalists fear that without 
originalism, judges will be unloosed, producing a system of interpretation that endangers 
self-government and is extremely hard to defend in terms of its consequences. One of the 
many virtues of Breyer’s book is its demonstration that these objections are overstated—
that without mechanical jurisprudence or rule-  
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